There is anecdotal evidence that local governments use traffic tickets to generate revenue. Using panel data for North Carolina counties, we examine whether changes in local government revenue influence the number of traffic tickets issued. We find strong evidence of an asymmetric response by local governments. Specifically, positive changes in revenue have no effect on traffic tickets, but negative revenue changes increase the number of traffic tickets issued. A one percentage point decrease in revenue yields a 0.38 percentage point increase in traffic tickets. We calculate that traffic ticket revenue supplements a low percentage of local revenue losses.
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I. Introduction
There are roughly 87,000 local taxing jurisdictions in the United States. The growth in local government revenue and the local government tax mix is a result of economic conditions, voter preferences, industry mix, and the political behavior and incentives of state legislators (Besley and Case, 2003; Crain, 2003) . As local tax bases have been exhausted and public opposition to increases in local tax rates has increased over time, local governments face increased pressures to find alternative sources of revenues. In addition, economic downturns often increase the demand for government services but result in less revenue since most local government tax revenues are procyclical Sobel, 1996, 1997; Crain, 2003) . Although local governments are more insulated from economic downturns than state governments because property tax revenue is more stable over the business cycle than other revenue sources, the increased reliance on sales and income taxes by local governments has increased their susceptibility to budget hardships during economic downturns. This was seen by the budget crises faced by state and local governments following the 2001 recession when many state and local governments experienced revenue decreases in excess of 5 percent (NASBO, 2002) .
Given increased pressures on obtaining local revenue from traditional sources and the increased variability of local government revenue, it seems reasonable that local government officials would have a desire to obtain revenues through indirect, less traditional sources. State governments have done this through state lotteries and the taxation of casino gaming. One very common indirect revenue source for local governments is traffic tickets.
There is anecdotal evidence that local governments rely on traffic tickets to generate additional local revenue. After a recent decrease in the number of traffic tickets issued in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, one city official expressed concern since traffic tickets provide much needed revenue to the local government. 4 City officials in Houston, Texas predicted that the number of traffic tickets issued was expected to rise again due to budget cuts resulting from reduced traffic fines. 5 The mayor of Nashville, Tennessee included a 33 percent increase in traffic ticket revenue in his final city budget. Using data on county governments in North Carolina over the period 1990 to 2003, this paper examines whether changes in local government revenue influence the number of traffic tickets issued. The empirical models are designed to capture any asymmetric effects of positive or negative revenue changes on traffic tickets, with the idea that opposing revenue changes of equal magnitude may create different responses by local governments. We find that changes in local revenues do affect the number of traffic tickets issued, and that the effect is highly asymmetric.
II. Data Description and Discussion
The number of traffic tickets issued in a county is a function of county demographics and a given level of law enforcement (Lee, 1985; Lave 1985; Graves et al., 1999) . Year to year changes in the number of tickets thus come from changes in county 7 "Parking Fines: Just the Revenue Ticket?" Governing Magazine, March 1995. See http://governing.com/archive/1995/mar/fines.txt. 8 For our purposes, we equate revenue smoothing with minimizing or reducing the variability in local government revenue over time via an optimal tax mix. Revenue smoothing has a somewhat different meaning in the macroeconomics literature. Mankiw (1987) developed the revenue smoothing hypothesis, which argues that an increase in government revenue requirements should increase the use of both taxes and inflation (see also Poterba and Rotemberg, 1990) . Clearly inflation control is beyond the powers of local government.
demographics and changes in traffic law enforcement. Changes in the enforcement of traffic laws can be a result of two factors: 1) increases or decreases in public safety campaigns (e.g. click-it-or-ticket) that are independent of local revenue conditions (Polinsky and Shavell, 1992) , or 2) changes in local revenue that result in local governments demanding more or less enforcement in order to generate the desired revenue from traffic tickets.
We use county level data from North Carolina counties over the period 1990 -2003. 9 In order to isolate the local revenue effect on the issuance of traffic tickets, our empirical models control for changes in county demographics and changes in traffic law enforcement that are independent of local revenue changes. Because we are interested in how changes in revenues affect traffic tickets, all of our variables are in annual percent changes. All monetary and count variables are normalized by county population to account for heterogeneity across counties. The majority of our county level data (unless specified otherwise) come from LINC (Log into North Carolina), an online database containing over 1,300 data items on local governments in North Carolina. 10 The remainder of this section discusses the variables we use in our empirical models.
Descriptive statistics for each variable are provided in Table 1 .
[ Table 1 about here]
Traffic Tickets
The annual number of traffic tickets issued in each county is the number of traffic infraction cases filed in District Court. All traffic tickets issued by law enforcement are Despite any forecasts, local governments do not know their actual revenue until the end of the budget cycle in a given year. In addition, local government fiscal policies in year t are often based on revenue conditions in year t-1 (Wong, 1995; Cirincione et al., 1999 on the number of traffic tickets and an increase in revenue to have a negative increase on the number of traffic tickets. A perfect asymmetric response can be testing the null hypothesis that the sum of the two revenue variables equals zero.
Demographic and Economic Controls
We include several demographic variables to control for county characteristics.
These variables include population density, the number of registered vehicles per capita, the percent of the population aged 15 to 24, the percent of the population registered to vote, and tourism expenditures per capita. Population density, the number of people per square mile, is included to capture potential differences in the number of traffic tickets issued in rural versus more urban areas. The county unemployment rate is also considered in the empirical models.
Changes in the county unemployment rate reflect changes in more recent economic conditions that are not captured by the local government revenue variables since the revenue variables are lagged by one period. The local government revenue variables also do not capture the changes in the expenditure side of local government that may result from changes in economic conditions. Changes in the county unemployment rate may thus reflect a greater demand for local government services during economic downturns, which may then increase the likelihood that traffic ticket would be used as an alternative revenue source.
Enforcement Controls
The local government revenue variables described earlier are designed to capture the possibility that local governments will demand more or less law enforcement in response to local revenue in order to generate desired revenue from traffic tickets. Law enforcement changes can also occur independently of local government revenue changes.
Examples include an increase in citizen demand for police presence and enforcement, a focus on public safety campaigns, or recognition by law enforcement officials that more enforcement is needed (e.g. a better allocation of police resources toward traffic law enforcement Finally, the one-year lag of the number of traffic accidents is considered in the models.
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Presumably, a greater number of traffic accidents in a county in year t-1 may increase the demand (either from citizens or law enforcement) for greater traffic law enforcement in year t.
III. Empirical Methodology and Results
The annual percentage change in traffic tickets is regressed on the local government revenue variables and the economic, demographic, and law enforcement The regressions use data for 96 of the 100 counties in North Carolina. Four counties were omitted due to lack of complete data. Initial estimates also considered a dummy variable for rural counties, per capita income, payroll employment, road miles, and net migration. The coefficients on these variables were not statistically significant and the inclusion of the variables in the models did not change the significance or magnitudes of the other coefficients. 19 We initially estimated the models using each of the six components of total revenue (property taxes, sales taxes, license taxes, permits and fees, state aid, and federal aid) rather than the single total revenue variable in hopes of capturing differences in the effect of changes in each revenue source on traffic tickets. None of the variables were statistically significant. Diagnostic tests revealed relatively large standard deviations for each variable compared to the total revenue variable. Summing the six revenue variables thus produces a total revenue variable with relatively less variation than the individual revenue series. See Garrett (2003) . 20 County dummy variables were also considered, but F-tests on the joint hypothesis that the coefficients equal zero could not be rejected at conventional levels. None of the individual county dummy coefficients were statistically significant, and the inclusion of the county dummy variables lowered the adjusted rsquared by roughly 0.05.
The one period lag of the dependent variable is also included in the models to account for potential serial correlation. In addition, our fourth specification considers both a one year lag and a two year lag in the local government revenue variables. The idea is that local governments may not only adjust traffic tickets in response to revenue changes last year, but also the year before. The coefficients estimates from the four empirical specifications are shown in Table 2 .
[ Table 2 about here]
Focusing first on the economic, demographic, and law enforcement control variables, the results in Table 2 reveal that several of the coefficients on these variables are statistically significant, but only a few coefficient estimates are robust across specifications. Changes in the unemployment rate have a negative and significant effect on changes in traffic tickets in all four specifications. This suggests that contemporaneous changes in local economic conditions have an effect on traffic tickets.
Specifically, a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate results in a 6.4
percentage point (averaging across specifications) increase in the number of traffic tickets. The other variable consistent across specifications is changes in population density. The results suggest that an increase in population density results in a decrease in the number of traffic tickets issued. Since this variable essentially captures increases in county population (since county area is fixed), the negative coefficient reveals that traffic tickets per capita decrease with increases in population, or that population rises faster than the number of traffic tickets.
The public safety expenditures coefficient is negative and significant in the first two specifications, but is insignificant in the models that include year dummy variables.
Similarly, the percentage change in registered voters is negative and significant in only the first specification, thus providing only marginal evidence that an increase in the political awareness of the constituency leads to a decrease in the number of traffic tickets issued.
Although the coefficients on each of the year dummy variables (2003 is omitted)
are not reported for the sake of brevity, they do provide some insights. First, all but two of the year dummies is statistically significant (1991 and 1998) in local government revenue, whereas tickets are acyclical in response to increases in local government revenue. F-tests conducted on the null hypothesis that the sum of the two revenue coefficients is equal to zero results in a rejection for each of the three empirical specifications. The positive traffic ticket effect resulting from decreases in local government revenue appear to occur with a one year lag only since the two year lagged revenue variables are not statistically significant.
The coefficients on the local government revenue variables provide evidence of asymmetric revenue smoothing. The fact that local governments increase traffic tickets during periods of revenue decreases but do not decrease traffic tickets in response to revenue increases reveals some degree of revenue maximization on the part of local governments. If local governments were truly revenue smoothers, then one would expected the positive and negative revenue coefficients to be of opposing signs but equal in magnitude. The fact that local governments increase traffic tickets to counter local revenue losses but do not decrease traffic tickets to counter revenue gains suggests that local governments behave, to some degree, as revenue maximizers. This is not to suggest that local governments behave as Leviathan (Brennan and Buchanan, 1977; Oates, 1985) , but rather local governments behave more like constrained revenue maximizers (constrained by economic conditions and citizen preferences) or zealous revenue generators.
22 22 Since our results suggest that, controlling for other factors, the number of traffic tickets issued changes in a systematic manner in response to local fiscal conditions rather than systematic changes in driving behavior, decreases in local government revenue may improve the efficiency of automobile insurance markets by reducing the asymmetric information between insurers and drivers. While numerous empirical studies of asymmetric information in the automobile insurance exist (see Chaippori, 2001 for a recent review), we are not aware of any study that examines local fiscal conditions as a potential means to reduce asymmetric information.
Revenue Effects
The empirical results discussed provide interesting insights into local governments' use of traffic tickets in response to local revenue changes. What the results cannot tell us, however, is how local government revenue changes influence traffic ticket revenue. Not only are local governments concerned with the quantity of tickets (at least in response to negative revenue changes), it is the revenue from these tickets that supplements local revenue losses. Specifically, we would like to know what percentage of local revenue losses are supplemented by traffic ticket revenue. To our knowledge, there is no available data on traffic ticket revenue by county. Although fines for most traffic violations are set by state legislatures and there are different fines for different traffic violations, we have no way of determining the fraction of total tickets that comes from various traffic violations. Despite the lack of actual traffic ticket revenue data, the coefficient estimates in Table 2 and other descriptive statistics can be used to arrive at a very rough idea of how much traffic ticket revenue supplements local revenue losses.
This analysis is discussed below.
The North Carolina Magistrates Association (NCMA) provides a list of all traffic infractions and the fines associated with each infraction (set by the state legislature). 24 A similar analysis was conducted using sales tax revenue rather than total revenue. Sales tax revenues per capita averaged $112.47 per capita over the sample period, so a one percentage point decrease in sales tax revenue is $1.12. Assuming the effects of local revenue and sales tax revenue are the same (an arguably strong assumption), then a one percentage point decrease in sales tax revenue results in a 0.38 percentage point increase in traffic tickets. As before, this translates into a traffic ticket revenue increase of 2.1 cents per capita (0.055 · 0.38). Thus, traffic tickets supplement about 1.9 percent ($0.021/$1.12) of the total decrease in sales tax revenue.
Certainly, however, local governments are aware the traffic ticket revenue cannot supplement a significant portion of lost local revenue, but rather traffic ticket revenue can help, to a small degree, in reducing the effects of local revenue losses. Second, issuing more traffic tickets requires more law enforcement, which draws scarce law enforcement resources from other police activities, such as criminal investigations, trainings, etc. into traffic enforcement. Despite the desire for greater revenue from traffic tickets, trainings and criminal investigations by the police may be higher priorities for local governments than traffic enforcement. Thus, local governments try to get more traffic enforcement, but are constrained by other priorities. Similarly, reallocating scare police resources is likely difficult over short periods of time.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
There is ample anecdotal evidence that local government use traffic tickets as a means of generating revenue. This paper provided the first empirical of the hypothesis that local governments do indeed use traffic tickets to increase revenue. Our analysis The results thus suggest that traffic tickets behave countercyclical to decreases in local government revenue, whereas tickets are acyclical in response to increases in local government revenue. Local governments in North Carolina are adverse to negative changes in revenue and local governments do not practice pure revenue smoothing since the number of traffic tickets issued does not decrease during periods of local government revenue growth. Traffic tickets appear to be a steady source of revenue for local governments, and this revenue source is tapped more heavily during periods of negative revenue growth.
Future research on the issue can focus on several points. First, this study used the changes in the number of traffic tickets as the dependent variable rather than changes in traffic ticket revenue given the absence of these data for North Carolina counties. Traffic ticket revenue data would allow a more precise analysis of the degree to which traffic ticket revenues supplement losses in local revenue. Rough calculations presented here suggest this effect is quite small, but actual ticket revenue data is likely to provide more precise estimates. Second, the focus of this study was North Carolina counties. The results here should not be generalized for other areas of the country, so it seems reasonable that similar studies to the one done here should be undertaken for other regions of the country. Finally, if data is available, a longer time horizon that includes more recessionary and expansionary periods and a focus on specific cities or town could prove useful. 
